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Plaintiff/appellant/ Gold Standard, Inc., submits this 
brief in reply to the brief of defendants/respondents American 
Barrick Resources Corporation, Barrick Resources (USA) Inc., 
Texaco Inc., Getty Oil Company and Getty Mining Company. 
ARGUMENT 
The courts strictly construe the attorney-client 
privilege and the work-product exception to discovery in order 
to prevent their misuse. Yet, the district court in this case 
permitted the defendants to withhold a document (the "June 11 
Agreement") that is part and parcel of the commercial 
transaction transferring the ownership of the Mercur Mine from 
Texaco to Barrick and signed in counterpart by six parties to 
the transaction on a claim of attorney-client privilege or 
attorney work-product. 
In an effort to avoid this error of law, the 
defendants raise, for the very first time, the assertion that 
the June 11 Agreement was not part and parcel of the commercial 
transaction. This assertion is squarely Contradicted by the 
testimony of Stephen Dattels and by the f&cts of this case. 
Having disavowed the fact that the June lj. Agreement was part 
of the commercial transaction, the defendants cite cases that 
protect confidential disclosures between attorneys and their 
clients made for the purpose of securing legal advice. The 
defendants, however, have not and cannot cite a single case 
where a court applied the attorney-client privilege or 
work-product doctrine to preclude discovery of a commercial 
agreement. In short, the defendants cannot conceal the June 11 
Agreement by the simple expedient of funneling it to counsel. 
Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 495 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 
1972) . 
I. Because The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law, 
The Supreme Court Should Review The Decision De Novo. 
The district court erred when it held the June 11 
Agreement, an agreement that was part and parcel of a 
commercial transaction, to be "privileged." R. at 4754. 
Although the defendants argue that the district court's 
conclusion can be overturned only if an abuse of discretion or 
clearly erroneous (Defendants' Brief at 1, 4-5), the decision 
to protect part of a commercial transaction by way of the 
attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine is a pure 
question of law or, alternatively, a mixed question of law and 
fact subject to de novo review. See Dole v. Milonas, 889 F.2d 
885, 889 (9th Cir. 1989); U.S. v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1415 
(9th Cir. 1989); Tornav v. U.S., 840 F.2d 1424, 1426 (9th Cir. 
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1988); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 803 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 
1986), corrected, 817 F.2d 64 (1987); U.S|. v. McConney. 728 
F.2d 1195, 1200-05 (9th Cir.)/ cert, denied, McConnev v. U.S., 
469 U.S. 824 (1984); and Lanodon v. Champion, 752 P.2d 999, 
1001 (Alaska 1988). 
II. The June 11 Agreement Was Part And Parcel Of The 
Business Arrangement That Transferred Ownership Of 
The Mercur Mine. 
After briefing and oral argument before the district 
court and after opposing Gold Standard's petition for an 
interlocutory appeal, the defendants assett, for the first 
time, that the June 11 Agreement was not jpart and parcel of the 
sale of the Mercur Mine. It was only "[otlut of an abundance of 
caution," they maintain, that Barrick's counsel disclosed the 
existence of a document that "may come within the purview of" 
the question asked of Mr. Stephen Dattels: "whether the Stock 
Purchase Agreement reflected the entire agreement between 
Barrick and Texaco with respect to the acquisition of the 
Mercur Mine?" Defendants' Brief at 13. Undoubtedly, it was 
also out of that same "abundance of caution" that the 
defendants chose not to reveal the existence of the June 11 
Agreement in any of the privilege logs supplied to Gold 
Standard or in their responses to interrogatories propounded by 
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Gold Standard. See Gold Standard's Brief at 3-4. And it must 
have been "[o]ut of an abundance of caution" that Barrick's 
counsel failed to provide the foundational information promised 
with respect to the June 11 Agreement to counsel for Gold 
Standard for nearly five months. See id., Fact No. 7. 
Barrick's counsel had to identify the June 11 
Agreement because it was responsive to the question of what 
other documents were part and parcel of the Mercur 
transaction. Based on that response, Gold Standard asked the 
district court to compel Barrick to produce the June 11 
Agreement on the grounds that it was part and parcel of a 
commercial transaction, a fact that the defendants never 
disputed in prior briefing or oral argument. Following an 
adverse ruling by the district court, Gold Standard petitioned 
for an interlocutory appeal on the grounds that the June 11 
Agreement was part and parcel of a commercial transaction. 
Again, the defendants did not deny this fact in opposing the 
petition. Now the defendants, in their brief to the Court, 
contend for the first time that the June 11 Agreement was not 
part and parcel of the commercial transaction for the sale of 
the Mercur Mine. As a matter of procedure, the defendants 
should not now be permitted to raise this issue. 
Nevertheless, the evidence in this case clearly 
demonstrates that the June 11 Agreement was a necessary 
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condition to the sale of the Mercur Mine. Had defendants 
raised this issue in the court below, Go^d Standard would have 
offered the following evidence: 
1) That Barrick's consultants, Kilborn Engineering, 
urged in a December 12, 19814 Report that any "bid 
on the Mercur project . . . be qualified to 
encompass . . . validity of Gold Standard 
claim." Exhibit 734, attached as Appendix "A." 
2) That Barrick's early offers to Texaco required a 
"90-day period within which it can substantiate 
and validate . . . Gold Standard claim." 
Exhibit 424, attached as Appendix "B." 
3) That on April 16, 1985, Barrick's Stephen Dattels 
noted that "Texaco was put 0n notice Gold 
Standard believes they have a first right of 
refusal." Exhibit 746, attached as Appendix "C." 
4) That Mr. Dattels testified: "I asked, as did my 
counsel, for a warranty witti respect to Gold 
Standard as well as other matters, and we asked 
that we be indemnified with respect to any breach 
of these warranties." Depo$ition of Stephen R. 
Dattels at 279, attached as Appendix "D." 
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5) That Gold Standard's counsel asked Mr. Dattels if 
he could point to the provisions in the Stock 
Purchase Agreement that he understood reflected 
"the indemnity by Texaco to Barrick for Gold 
Standard's claims/' to which Mr. Dattels 
responded, after reading portions of the Stock 
Purchase Agreement: "There's something else I 
have to check in this agreement that might relate 
to this, if I can find it. You'll have to give 
me a minute." Id. at 298. 
6) That after checking with counsel, counsel 
represented: "off the record, Mr. Dattels and I 
have had a conversation about some additional 
contractual material that may be responsive to 
your question. However, I have advised him that 
that particular document is lawyer's work product 
and that he is not permitted for that reason to 
respond to it." Id. 
7) That in order to clarify that the additional 
document which Mr. Dattels and counsel discussed 
was part and parcel of the sale of Mercur, Gold 
Standard's counsel inquired: 
-6-
BURTON: In that connection, Gordon 
and Mr. Dattels, is there any 
written document in addition 
to the purchase agreement of 
May 15th which contains terms 
or conditions relative to 
Barrick1s acquisition of the 
Mercur Mine from Texaco? 
ROBERTS: That document I'm referring 
to [the June 11 Agreement] is 
a document, and ip does have 
provisions in it that relate 
to this— 
Id. at 298-99 (emphasis addfed)• 
That, in order to obtain non-recourse financing 
from Bank of America, with v^ hich to acquire the 
Mercur Mine, Barrick needed to satisfy the bank 
that the mine could support bhe requested 
financing and that Barrick v^ ould have clear title 
to the mine. See Exhibits 1808 and 1932, 
attached as Appendices MEH and "F," 
respectively. To that end, Barrick obtained an 
ore reserve report on June 11, 1985, a Kilborn 
technical evaluation of the mine on June 11, 
1985, and a waiver from Gold! Company of America 
purportedly releasing Barriclk from any obligation 
to acquire Mercur for Gold Company, again on 
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June 11, 1985. See Exhibits 436, 437, and 383, 
attached as Appendices "G," MH,,e and "I," 
respectively. Then, with the June 11 Agreement, 
the Bechtel Report, the Kilborn Report, and the 
Gold Company waiver, Barrick met with the bank on 
June 13, 1985, in order to secure financing. 
Exhibit 1928, attached as Appendix "J." 
9) That the sale of the Mercur Mine closed on June 
28, 1985. 
Had defendants attempted to argue below that the June 11 
Agreement was "not directed at the June 1985 sale" as they now 
contend (Defendants * Brief at 13), they would never have been 
able to support their claim. Having failed to raise this issue 
below, defendants cannot now dispute that the June 11 Agreement 
was an integral condition, the execution of which was necessary 
to Barrick*s acquisition of the Mercur Mine. 
III. The Attorney-Client Privilege And Work-Product 
Doctrine Do Not Protect Documents Created And 
Executed As Part Of Commercial Transactions. 
The defendants claim that the June 11 Agreement is 
protected by the attorney-client privilege. According to the 
defendants, the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is "to 
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encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and 
their clients." Defendants1 Brief at 7. Where six parties to 
a sales transaction sign an agreement to allocate the risks or 
costs associated with a third party's claim, they are not 
engaging in full and frank communication$ with attorneys; they 
are executing a commercial agreement. That agreement does not 
become attorney-client privileged by the simple expedient of 
tunneling it to counsel. Jackson, 495 P.2d at 1257. 
The defendants likewise claim that the Agreement is 
protected by the work-product doctrine. According to the 
defendants, the purpose of the work-product doctrine is "to 
allow parties to avail themselves of an opposing lawyer's work 
product." Defendants' Brief at 8. Clearly, the defendants 
executed this agreement to consummate the sale of the mine, a 
non-litigation purpose. Gold Standard seeks the June 11 
Agreement to establish the negotiations for and terms of the 
sale. Gold Standard seeks the document as evidence in support 
of its claims that the defendants intentionally denied Gold 
Standard its rights and interests. Gold (Standard is not 
attempting to avail itself of the defendants' legal research. 
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IV. There Is No Support For Extending The 
Attorney-Client Privilege Or The Work-Product 
Doctrine To An Agreement Entered Into As Part 
Of A Commercial Transaction. 
The defendants ask the Court to protect the June 11 
Agreement by asserting that, while it is in the nature of a 
retainer agreement, it contains confidential communications and 
attorney work-product. Certainly retainer agreements are not 
privileged. See Salstone v. General Felt Industries, 1986 W.L. 
13738, *2-3 (N.D. 111. 1986) (attached as Appendix "K M); Bailey 
v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211, 214-15 (N.D. 111. 1972); 
Oppenheimer v. Oscar Shoes, Inc., 488 N.Y.S.2d 693, 695 (App. 
Div. 1985); People v. Beige, 399 N.Y.S.2d 539, 539-40 (App. 
Div. 1977). 
But the June 11 Agreement is not simply a retainer 
agreement possibly containing protected matter; it is an 
agreement signed in counterpart as part of a commercial 
transaction. Because the law does not shield otherwise 
protectable matter contained in a commercial agreement, the 
defendants cannot cite a single case in which a court has 
protected a document, in the nature of a retainer agreement, 
created and executed as part of a sales transaction, under 




To extend the protection afforded by the 
attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine to the 
June 11 Agreement would set a precedent that would allow all 
manner of commercial agreements, whether legal, illegal, or 
evidence of illegality, to be funneled to counsel. In this 
case, unless the Court reverses the decision of the district 
court, Gold Standard will be prevented from putting before the 
jury key evidence of how defendants structured the transaction 
for the transfer of the Mercur Mine without regard to and in 
violation of Gold Standard's rights. Gold Standard has a right 
to put that evidence before the trier of fact. 
For the foregoing reasons, Gold Standard respectfully 
requests the Court reverse the decision of the district court. 
DATED this^Q day of January, 1990. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
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